The Problem with the Dock Case by Littlewood, M
Title The Problem with the Dock Case
Author(s) Littlewood, M
Citation Hong Kong Law Journal, 1999, v. 29, p. 59-82
Issued Date 1999
URL http://hdl.handle.net/10722/161506
Rights Creative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License
Hong Kong Law Journal
1999
Article
The Problem with the Dock Case
Michael Littlewood
Copyright (c) 1999 by Sweet & Maxwell Asia; Michael Littlewood
Citation:
29 HKLJ 59
*1 Commissioner of Inland Revenue v The Hong Kong and Whampoa Dock Co Ltd 1 (commonly and
conveniently referred to as the ‘Dock case’) is one of the most important cases - perhaps the most
important case - in Hong Kong tax law. As is well known, the case concerned the ‘source’ principle,
upon which Hong Kong's tax system is based and in accordance with which s 14 of the Inland
Revenue Ordinance confines the charge to profits tax to profits ‘arising in or derived from Hong Kong.’
The Dock case was only the second 2 ever reported Hong Kong case on source, and the first decision
of the Full Court (predecessor to the Court of Appeal). In the four decades since the case was
decided, it has been frequently cited and relied upon. Indeed, the courts, 3 writers of text books, 4 and
other commentators 5 have routinely taken the Dock case as not merely correct, but as more or less
axiomatic. Consequently, it is fair to say that the prevailing interpretation of the geographical scope of
profits tax is squarely based upon this case. The aim of this article, however, is to suggest that the
Dock case is at best profoundly misleading, if not simply wrong, in that the Full Court's reasoning, and
perhaps also its decision, are contrary to what is perhaps binding 6 Privy Council authority.
*1 The problem with the Dock case is that the Full Court should have followed the decision of the
Privy Council in the 1900 New South Wales case Commissioners of Taxation v Kirk, 7 but did not.
Kirk's case established the basic principle that, in some circumstances, at least, source-based income
tax legislation, such as Hong Kong's Inland Revenue Ordinance, 8 implicitly requires the
‘apportionment’ of profits derived 9 partly from within the taxing *60 jurisdiction and partly from outside
it. In other words, according to Kirk's case, a profit derived partly from Hong Kong and partly from
outside Hong Kong is taxable to the extent that it is derived from Hong Kong. Reece J (who delivered
the leading judgment in the Dock case) accepted as a fact that the profit in question (which was
produced by salvaging a ship outside Hong Kong and returning it to its owner in Hong Kong) was
derived partly from Hong Kong and partly from outside Hong Kong. As a decision of the Privy Council,
Kirk's case was (and perhaps remains) binding in Hong Kong. 10 Therefore, in the absence of any
grounds upon which the case could be distinguished, Reece J should have followed it. He made no
attempt to distinguish Kirk's case. Indeed, he purported to follow it. He should therefore have
concluded that the Dock company's profit was taxable, but only in part. And yet he did not: rather, he
concluded that it was not taxable at all.
*2 The reason appears to be that Reece J misunderstood Kirk's case. More specifically, he seems to
have thought that the Privy Council in Kirk did not order apportionment. In other words, he seems to
have missed the whole point of the case. Precisely how this misunderstanding came about is, of
course, impossible to say, but it appears that Reece J may have been led astray by the ambiguously
worded headnote with which the report of Kirk's case is encumbered. 11 This headnote is so
deceptively worded that one wonders whether the person who wrote it understood the case; but that
Reece J relied on the headnote seems clear from the fact that he incorporated virtually the whole of it
in his own judgment. 12 But whether it was the headnote to Kirk's case which led Reece J astray, or
the judgment 13 itself, or some other factor, the unfortunate point is that his reasoning seems plainly
flawed.
*2 More unfortunate still is that the Dock case has been far more influential than its facts might
suggest. Salvage, of course, is an economic activity of relatively little importance, but the Dock case
seems to have been universally regarded in Hong Kong as establishing not only that the profits of
salvage must be either taxable in full or not taxable at all, but that all profits, however produced, must
be either taxable in full or not at all. That is, s 14 of the Inland Revenue Ordinance came to be
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interpreted as neither requiring nor permitting the apportionment of profits in any circumstances. In
other words, the Dock case seems to have led Hong Kong's courts, Inland Revenue Department, and
taxpaying community completely to ignore the rule in Kirk's case. Since Kirk's case was a decision of
the Privy Council, this seems clearly to have been wrong. The error was partially corrected in the
1990 Hong Kong case Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Hang Seng Bank Ltd, 14 in which the Privy
Council said that the *61 Inland Revenue Ordinance implicitly requires the apportionment of profits in
some circumstances. This obliged the Inland Revenue Department to acknowledge that
apportionment is at least theoretically possible, but the Department continued (and continues still) to
maintain that apportionment will not have ‘a wide application.’ 15 In practice, this seems to mean that
the Department almost invariably insists that profits are either taxable in full, or not at all. And, given
that the Department is loath to accept that the profits of a business carried on in Hong Kong are not
taxable at all, this, in turn, leads it almost invariably to insist that such profits are taxable in full. 16
*3 The Department seems not to have offered any legal authority for this restrictive interpretation of
the rule in Kirk's case, but it seems to be derived from Reece J's faulty reasoning in the Dock case. It
is true that the scope of the rule in Kirk's case is debatable but, if (as I suggest) Reece J's reasoning
in the Dock case is deficient, it is difficult to construct any basis upon which the Department's current
position on apportionment can be supported. In other words, profits which are derived partly from
Hong Kong and partly from outside Hong Kong and which are currently regarded (on the basis of the
wrongly reasoned Dock case) as taxable in full, are actually (on the authority of the neglected Privy
Council decision in Kirk's case), at least in some circumstances, taxable only in part. Given Hong
Kong's role as a centre of international trade and finance, it is obviously common for Hong Kong firms
to produce profits which could be said to be derived partly from Hong Kong and partly from outside
Hong Kong. Rectifying Reece J's errors in the Dock case, and defining the scope of the rule in Kirk's
case, are therefore matters of considerable consequence, both conceptual and practical.
*3 This article consists of five parts. In the first part, I review Kirk's case and its misleading headnote.
In the second part, I examine some of the more important judgments in the series of subsequent
cases in which the Privy Council, the High Court of Australia, and various other courts have
considered the scope of the rule in Kirk's case. In particular, it is necessary to review Commissioner of
Taxation (New South Wales) v Hillsdon Watts Ltd 17 because Reece J's erroneous reliance on this
case was one of the factors which led him to misinterpret Kirk's case; and it is necessary to review
some of the other cases in the series because there is no other way of satisfactorily explaining
Hillsdon Watts. In the third part of the article, I examine the Dock case, focusing on Reece J's
incorrect *62 interpretation of Kirk and on his erroneous reliance on Hillsdon Watts. In this part, I also
suggest how the Dock case ought to have been decided. In the fourth part, I explain how the errors in
the Dock case have been perpetuated and compounded in subsequent cases. Finally, in the fifth part,
I return to the rule in Kirk's case, for the purpose of examining its scope. In other words, in this part, I
discuss when Hong Kong's Inland Revenue Ordinance implicitly requires apportionment, and when it
does not.
Kirk's case
*4 The taxpayers in Commissioners of Taxation v Kirk 18 were the large and well-known Australian
mining company, Broken Hill Proprietary Co Ltd (‘BHP’), and one of its subsidiaries; the individual Kirk
after whom the case is named was their representative. The two companies operated mines in New
South Wales. They extracted ore from these mines and processed it so as to convert it into a
merchantable product. The processing, like the extraction, took place in New South Wales. 19 The
companies then sold the product at a profit. The sales were effected 20 by the companies' offices in
Melbourne and London.
*4 The companies were assessed to tax on the whole of these profits under s 15 of the New South
Wales Land and Income Tax Assessment Act 1895, which imposed tax on income ‘[a]rising ․․․ from
any ․․․ source whatsoever in New South Wales.’ 21 Thus, the New South Wales Act, like Hong Kong's
Inland Revenue Ordinance, was based on the source principle. That is, it sought to tax only domestic
income, not offshore income. The New South Wales Act also resembled Hong Kong's Inland Revenue
Ordinance in that it was silent as to *63 the possibility that a profit might be derived partly from within
the taxing jurisdiction, and partly from outside it. That is, it made no express provision for how to deal
with a profit arising partly from sources within New South Wales, and partly from sources outside New
South Wales. There seem, however, to be two possible interpretations. First, s 15 might implicitly
have required the apportionment of such profits. That is, s 15, properly interpreted, might in some
circumstances have imposed tax on the profit in question to the extent that it was derived from New
South Wales. In other words, the part of the profit derived from New South Wales was taxable, and
the part derived from outside New South Wales was not. Alternatively, s 15 might have required, in all
cases, an ‘all or nothing’ interpretation. That is, it might have required that either the whole profit was
taxable, or that none of it was.
*4 According to the interpretation of source-based income tax legislation prevailing at the time, a profit
made on the sale of goods is derived entirely from the place where the sale is effected, irrespective of
where and how the taxpayer acquired the goods. This was confirmed in Re Tindal, 22 in which the
taxpayer produced goods in New South Wales and sold them in the United Kingdom. The Supreme
Court of New South Wales held that the profit thereby produced was derived entirely from the United
Kingdom, and that it was therefore not taxable at all in New South Wales.
*4 The assessments levied in Kirk's case thus constituted a direct challenge to the prevailing
interpretation. It was argued on behalf of the commissioners, first, that the companies' profits arose
entirely in Australia and that they were therefore taxable in full. In the alternative, counsel for the
commissioners maintained that the companies' profits, if not taxable in full, were at least taxable in
part. The Supreme Court of New South Wales rejected this challenge and confirmed the interpretation
of the law which it had laid down in Re Tindal. That is, it held that the profits in question were derived,
in their entirety, from sources outside New South Wales and that they were therefore not taxable at
all. 23 The Privy Council, however, accepted the alternative interpretation proposed on behalf of the
commissioners. That is, the Privy Council held, first, that the profits had arisen partly in New South
Wales (where the ore was extracted from the ground and processed) and partly outside New South
Wales (where the contracts of sale were effected) and, second, that the statute therefore implicitly
required the apportionment of the profits. In other words, the part of the profit attributable to the
extraction and processing of the ore in New South Wales was taxable, but the part attributable to the
making of sales outside New South Wales was not.
*5 Kirk's case thus established the principle that a profit made by manufacturing goods in one
jurisdiction and selling them in another is derived partly from *64 each, and that apportionment is
therefore required. 24 It is precisely because the case established this principle that it is important.
This is not at all apparent from the headnote, however, which is worded, in full, as follows:
*5 Where income was in part derived from the extraction of ore from the soil of New South Wales
Colony, and from the conversion in the latter Colony of the crude ore into a merchantable product:
*5 Held, that this income was assessable under the New South Wales Land and Income Tax Act of
1895, s15, sub-ss 3, 4, notwithstanding that the finished products were sold exclusively outside the
Colony.
*5 In re Tindal, (1897) 18 NSWLR 378, overruled. 25
*5 This is ambiguous. The headnote states that ‘this income was assessable,’ but it is unclear
whether ‘this income’ means the whole of the income, or only the part of it which was derived from
New South Wales. If the writer of the headnote (one Herbert Cowell) intended the former meaning, he
was simply wrong, for that is not what the Privy Council decided. If he intended the latter meaning, he
was not exactly wrong, but he did nonetheless fail to communicate the basic point of the case. In the
Dock case, Reece J seems to have interpreted this headnote (which he recited in full, 26 except for the
last line) as meaning that the whole profit was taxable and, therefore, that apportionment was not
required. But, as I have explained, the whole point of Kirk's case is that the Privy Council held that
apportionment was required. 27
*5 The confusion is not wholly attributable to the writer of the headnote. Kirk's case came before the
Privy Council by way of the ‘case stated’ procedure; and the case stated by the court of first instance
for the appellate courts was formulated as follows:
*5 *65 (a) Had the company 28 any income in 1897 within the meaning and operation of the Land and
Income Tax Assessment Act of 1895, and liable to taxation under the provisions of that Act?
*5 (b) Did the judgment in In re Tindal 29 govern this case? 30
*5 The Privy Council's judgment (which was delivered by Lord Davey) is principally devoted to
explaining that the Supreme Court of New South Wales had been wrong to conclude that the whole of
the taxpayers' profits had arisen outside New South Wales; that, on the contrary, part of their profits
had arisen in New South Wales; and that this part was taxable. Having explained that this was so,
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however, Lord Davey concluded in the following terms: ‘Their Lordships are, therefore, of opinion that
the first question stated in the special case on each of these appeals should have been answered in
the affirmative, and that is all they are called upon to say.’ 31 In other words, the stated case required
the Privy Council to decide only whether any part of the taxpayers' income was taxable; it did not
require a decision as to how much of the profit was taxable. 32 It would have been helpful if the
Judicial Committee had answered this second question also but, as Lord Davey said, it was not called
upon to do so. Some of the blame can perhaps be attributed to those who drafted the case; had they
asked the court to rule as to the extent to which, if at all, the taxpayers' profits were taxable, a
century's confusion might have been avoided at the outset. 33
Subsequent cases on source and apportionment
*6 Kirk's case seems to have been the first Privy Council decision on source. It established the basic
rule that, at least in some circumstances, source-based income tax legislation of the kind which was
usual throughout the British Empire 34 in the early years of the twentieth century (and which is still in
force *66 in Hong Kong 35) implicitly requires the apportionment of profits derived partly from within the
taxing jurisdiction and partly from outside it. Given the prevalence of such legislation, and given that
the rule in Kirk's case is obviously fundamental to its interpretation, it is not surprising that there
followed a series of cases on the source principle generally 36 and on the scope of the rule in Kirk's
case in particular. 37 In order to expose Reece J's errors in the Dock case, however, it is necessary to
refer to only a small number of them. 38
*6 For present purposes, the most important of these cases are the decisions of the Privy Council 39 in
Lovell & Christmas Ltd v Commissioner 67of Taxes, 40 International Harvester Co of Canada Ltd v
Provincial Tax Commission, 41 and Provincial Treasurer of Manitoba v Wm Wrigley Jr Co Ltd. 42 These
decisions, although of binding authority in Hong Kong, seem to have been generally ignored in the
territory, perhaps as a consequence of Reece J's reasoning in the Dock case. In Lovell & Christmas v
Commissioner of Taxes, 43 the taxpayer carried on business in England. It had one employee who
was resident in New Zealand and another who visited New Zealand annually. The function of these
employees was to make arrangements with New Zealand dairy manufacturers whereby the taxpayer
would sell their produce in England. Pursuant to these arrangements, the manufacturers sent their
butter and cheese on consignment to the taxpayer in England. The taxpayer sold it, withheld an
agreed commission, and remitted the balance to the manufacturers. The Privy Council held that the
taxpayer's profit was derived entirely from the United Kingdom and that it was therefore not taxable in
New Zealand at all. Sir Arthur Wilson (delivering the judgment of the Privy Council) explained:
*6 The moneys received by the [taxpayer], out of which they deduct their commission, and from
which, therefore, their profits come, are paid to them under the contract of sale effected in London.
The earlier arrangements entered into in New Zealand appear to their Lordships to be transactions
the object and effect of which is to bring goods from New Zealand within the net of the business which
is to yield a profit. To make those transactions a ground for taxing, in New Zealand, the profits actually
realized in London would, in their Lordships' opinion, be to extend the area of taxation further than the
authorities warrant. 44
*7 The decision seems to confirm that a profit made by selling goods is generally derived from the
place where the goods are sold, but the judgment is unsatisfactory insofar as the Privy Council did not
explain why the rule in Kirk's case did not apply. That is, the Privy Council did not explain why
apportionment was not required. Indeed, the Privy Council did not mention Kirk's case, or the
possibility of apportionment, at all.
*7 In International Harvester Co of Canada Ltd v Provincial Tax Commission 45 the taxpayer
manufactured goods in Ontario and sold them in Saskatchewan. It was assessed to tax in
Saskatchewan, under income tax legislation based on the source principle, on the whole of the profit
thereby produced. The Privy *68 Council followed its own earlier decision in Kirk, and held that
apportionment was required. The decision simply confirms that, in the half-century which had elapsed
since Kirk's case, nothing had changed. The facts of Provincial Treasurer of Manitoba v Wm Wrigley
Jr Co Ltd 46 were similar. The taxpayer manufactured chewing gum in Ontario and sold it in Manitoba.
Again, the Privy Council held that apportionment was required. These cases confirm that the rule in
Kirk's case is not confined to the particular New South Wales statute there in issue but, rather, that it
applies to source-based income tax legislation generally. Also, in the International Harvester case, the
Privy Council endorsed wholesale value as a basis for calculating apportionment. But these cases
otherwise provide little guidance as to when apportionment is required, and when it is not.
*7 Also important is a series of decisions of the High Court of Australia in which the scope of the rule
in Kirk's case was considered. 47 In Mount Morgan Gold Mining Co Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation
(Queensland) 48 the facts were complicated but essentially involved mining gold in Queensland and
selling it outside Queensland. By a majority, the court held that apportionment was necessary. The
facts of Dickson v Commissioner of Taxation (New South Wales) 49 were substantially identical.
Again, by a majority, the High Court ordered apportionment. In Commissioner of Taxation of Western
Australia v D & W Murray Ltd 50 the taxpayer purchased goods in the United Kingdom and sold them
in Western Australia. The taxpayer claimed, on the basis of Kirk's case, that Western Australia's
source-based income tax legislation implicitly required the apportionment of the profit thereby
produced, but the court (combined judgment of Knox CJ and Rich and Dixon JJ) held that the profit
was entirely sourced in Western Australia and, therefore, taxable in full in that state. Like Lovell &
Christmas v Commissioner of Taxes, 51 the Murray case thus confirmed that a profit made by buying
and selling goods is generally derived from the place where the goods are sold. Unlike the Lovell &
Christmas case, however, the Murray case offered an explanation for why apportionment was not
required:
*8 *69 [This] case is not one in which operations in one place have produced a merchantable
commodity, or have given or added value to things, marketed in another. In such cases value or
wealth has been produced or increased and is contained in disposable assets. In other words,
unrealized profits exist in the territory whence they are transported for the purpose of sale. In the case
now to be decided, the [taxpayer's] business operations conducted in England by its head office
consisted only in buying. They neither gave nor added value to the things which were purchased.
There were no unrealized profits brought into existence, and contained in the goods when exported
from England. 52
*8 The calculation of apportionment on the basis of added value was discussed further in Federal
Commissioner of Taxation v W Angliss and Co Pty Ltd, 53 in which the taxpayer dealt in meat and
tallow. It produced the meat, and some of the tallow, itself in New South Wales. The rest of the tallow
it purchased from other suppliers in New South Wales. The taxpayer sold all the meat and all the
tallow in the United Kingdom. Sales were effected by a branch office in London. The High Court of
Australia held that the source of the entire profit thereby produced was the United Kingdom, where
the goods were sold, and that therefore no tax was payable in Australia. The distinction between this
case and the other similar cases in which the courts had ordered apportionment 54 was that the meat
and tallow could not have been sold at a profit in Australia. The meat consisted of substandard
carcasses and offal. There was no market at all for these products in Australia, but they were saleable
in the United Kingdom, because of the unusual state of the market brought about by the war (the
profits in question having been made in 1918 and 1919). Similarly, although the taxpayer had sold its
tallow at a profit in the United Kingdom, it could not have done so in Australia. The reason, again, was
that the value of the tallow in Australia was no more than it had cost the taxpayer to produce or to
purchase. Dixon J (with whom Rich and McTiernan JJ concurred; Starke and Evatt JJ dissenting)
began by explaining the circumstances in which apportionment was required:
*8 [It is necessary to recognise] that production of itself may create profit and that sale may be no
more than the conversion of profit into money: the *70 realization of a profit already contained in the
goods. What is true of production is doubtless true also of other operations in connection with
commodities. By the treatment or preparation of goods, indeed, possibly by their mere purchase at a
low price, a gain may be obtained in one place before they are shipped or sold in another. 55
*8 Having set out these principles, Dixon J proceeded to apply them to the facts of the case:
*9 The application of these principles reduces the question of most importance in the present case to
one of fact, namely, what amount of the moneys realized by the sale of the goods in the United
Kingdom represented value in exchange or money's-worth which existed in Australia independently of
the extraterritorial operations of the taxpayer? 56
*9 His answer to this question was that in Australia the meat had had no value beyond the cost of its
production and the tallow had had no value beyond what the taxpayer had paid for it. Thus, according
to Dixon J, the entire profit had its source in the United Kingdom and apportionment was therefore not
required.
*9 W Angliss & Co therefore stands for two main propositions. First, apportionment is not invariably
required when the taxpayer has manufactured goods in one jurisdiction and sold them in another, but
only when it has added value in both jurisdictions. Second, the rule in Kirk's case is not confined to
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manufacturers. Rather, apportionment is required of a profit made by buying and selling goods, if the
taxpayer purchases the goods ‘at a low price.’ 57 By this Dixon J seems to have meant a lower price
than the price at which the taxpayer could have sold the goods in the place where it purchased them.
In other words, if the taxpayer could have sold the goods at a profit in the place where it purchased
them, then apportionment is required; and the amount of profit which the taxpayer would have made,
had it sold the goods in the place where it purchased them, is to be attributed to that place.
*9 Finally, it is necessary to mention Commissioner of Taxation (New South Wales) v Hillsdon Watts
Ltd, 58 because Reece J's misplaced reliance on a passage from the judgment of Dixon J in this case
was central to his flawed reasoning in the Dock case. Like Angliss, Hillsdon Watts involved both
manufacturing profits and trading profits. The taxpayer carried on in New South Wales a business of
exporting plants and seeds. Some of the plants and seeds it produced *71 itself; the rest it purchased
from other suppliers. The High Court of Australia unanimously held that apportionment was required
of both categories of profits. Hillsdon Watts differs from the other cases mentioned in this article,
however, in that the legislation under which the taxpayer had been assessed expressly 59 required the
apportionment of profits derived partly from the taxing jurisdiction (New South Wales) and partly from
elsewhere. This express requirement was provided for by s 28 of the New South Wales Income Tax
(Management) Act 1928. 60
*9 Although all five members of the court (Latham CJ, Rich, Dixon, Evatt, and McTiernan JJ) held that
apportionment was required, four of them (all but Dixon J) seem to have attached very little, if any,
significance to s 28. Rather, they appear to have thought (on the basis of Kirk's case and the various
subsequent cases in which the rule in Kirk's case had been applied, considered, and refined 61) that
the statute would have implicitly required apportionment of the profits in question, even in the absence
of s 28. In other words, they seem to have regarded s 28 as merely expressing a requirement which
would in any event have been implicit. For example, Latham CJ based his decision on the following
proposition:
*10 It has long been recognised that these provisions [in source-based income tax legislation], apart
altogether from any statutory provisions requiring apportionment, impose a tax not upon the whole
income if any part thereof is derived from the source mentioned, but only upon the part of the income
shown to be so derived. This was decided in Commissioners of Taxation v Kirk very soon after the
introduction of income tax in Australia. 62
*10 That this approach effectively rendered s 28 redundant seems not to have troubled any of the
court's members except for Dixon J, who attempted to salvage some purpose for it by suggesting that
it would require the apportionment of profits in circumstances in which, in its absence, apportionment
would not have been implicitly required by the rule in Kirk's case. This analysis, in turn, required Dixon
J to suggest that there are types of profit which do not lend themselves to apportionment; and that,
notwithstanding Kirk's case, in the *72 absence of legislation specifically requiring apportionment it
would be necessary to regard such a profit as either taxable in full or not taxable at all. 63 But Dixon J's
views as to the circumstances in which apportionment is implicitly required by statutes other the one
with which he was concerned in the case before him were, obviously, obiter. Moreover, they were not
endorsed by any of the other members of the court. They were to prove crucial in Hong Kong,
however, for, as will be seen, they were to form the basis for Reece J's flawed analysis in the Dock
case.
The Dock case
*10 The taxpayer in the Dock case 64 carried on business in Hong Kong as, among other things, a
salvager of ships. It was contacted by the owner of a ship (the Bintang) which had run aground on a
reef at the Paracel Islands. 65 The ship was stuck on the reef and damaged. The owner asked the
taxpayer to repair the ship, re-float it, and tow it to Hong Kong. The taxpayer did not immediately
commit itself as to whether it would attempt what the owner had requested, but it did dispatch a tug to
investigate. On board the tug, in addition to its regular complement, was the Dock company's salvage
officer. Upon arrival at the Paracels he inspected the stranded ship and decided it was salvageable.
An agreement was thereupon entered into, at the Paracels, between the taxpayer (represented by its
salvage officer) and the ship-owner (represented by the master of the Bintang) whereby the taxpayer
agreed to attempt to salvage the ship and the owner agreed to pay, if the taxpayer succeeded. The
attempt was indeed successful: the taxpayer repaired the ship, re-floated it, and towed it back to Hong
Kong; and the owner duly paid. According to the Commissioner of Inland Revenue, the profit realised
by the taxpayer on this endeavour was derived in its entirety from Hong Kong. Therefore, according to
the Commissioner, the profit was taxable in full. The taxpayer appealed and, ultimately, 66 the Full
Court (the leading judgment was given by Reece J, with whom Blair-Kerr and Macfee JJ simply
concurred) held that the profit had been derived entirely from outside Hong Kong and that it was
therefore not taxable at all.
*11 The problem with the Dock case is Reece J's reasoning and, in particular, the way in which he
dealt with the possibility of apportionment. Like the statute in Kirk's case (the New South Wales Land
and Income Tax Assessment Act *73 1895), Hong Kong's Inland Revenue Ordinance was (and
remains) silent as to the possibility of apportionment. That is, it makes no mention of the possibility
that a profit might be derived partly from Hong Kong, and partly from outside Hong Kong. As in the
case of the New South Wales Act, however, there seem to be only two possible interpretations. First,
s 14 might implicitly require the apportionment of profits in some circumstances. That is, s 14,
properly interpreted, might in some circumstances impose tax on the profit in question to the extent
that it is derived from Hong Kong. In other words, the part of the profit derived from Hong Kong is
taxable, and the part derived from outside Hong Kong is not. Alternatively, s 14 might require, in all
cases, an ‘all or nothing’ interpretation. That is, it might require that either the whole profit is taxable,
or that none of it is.
*11 The services provided by the Dock company to the owner of the Bintang were performed partly
outside Hong Kong (where the Bintang was re-floated and towed through international waters) and
partly in Hong Kong (where the Bintang was towed through Hong Kong waters and returned to its
owner). Reece J therefore accepted as a fact that the Dock company's profit was derived partly from
Hong Kong and partly from outside Hong Kong. 67 Since the Privy Council's decision in Kirk's case
was binding on him, 68 he should therefore have held that apportionment was required. 69 That is, he
should have held that the part of the profit derived from Hong Kong was taxable, and that the part
derived from outside Hong Kong was not.
*11 Of course, Kirk's case itself was concerned with manufacturing, not salvage, but it is difficult to
conceive of any principled basis upon which it could be said that the rule in Kirk's case does not apply
to a profit made by performing services partly within the jurisdiction and partly outside it. Indeed, it
seems nowadays to be universally agreed that a profit produced by means of providing services *74
is derived from the place where the services are performed 70 and, therefore, that the Inland Revenue
Ordinance implicitly requires the apportionment of a profit made by providing services both within and
outside Hong Kong. This is the position of the Inland Revenue Department 71 and it is not
controversial. 72 That the rule in Kirk's case applies in services cases is illustrated by Commissioner of
Taxation v Cam & Sons Ltd, 73 a case concerned with the source of wages paid to men employed on
fishing trawlers which sailed from New South Wales but spent most of their time, and caught most of
their fish, outside New South Wales waters. It was held that apportionment was required. But, in any
event, Reece J made no attempt to distinguish Kirk's case, either on the basis that it applies only to
manufacturers or on any other ground. On the contrary, Reece J seems to have thought that he was
following Kirk's case. It is possible also that the rule in Kirk's case is subject to a de minimis
exception, 74 or to some other limitation; and that for this reason Reece J was right to conclude that
the Inland Revenue Ordinance did not implicitly require the apportionment of the Dock company's
profit. But this was not suggested by Reece J, either. Rather, as I have said, Reece J seems to have
thought he was following Kirk's case.
*12 Exactly how the apportionment of the Dock company's profit should have been calculated is
debatable, but valuing the different stages of the services provided by the Dock company, and then
apportioning the company's profit on the basis of these values, would appear to be an exercise of no
particular difficulty. No doubt there is scope for differences of opinion as to precisely how large a part
of the profit should have been attributed to each stage, but that is so of virtually all cases in which
apportionment might be required. 75 It is worth noting, in particular, that calculating apportionment in
services cases (such as the Dock case) would appear to present considerably less difficulty than in
manufacturing cases of the kind in which the Privy Council has ordered apportionment. 76
*12 But Reece J did not apply the principle established in Kirk's case. Instead, he held that the Dock
company's profit was not apportionable. That is, he held *75 that it must be either taxable in full, or not
taxable at all. And, having allowed himself only these two options, he held that it was not taxable at
all. On the assumption that the Inland Revenue Ordinance did not implicitly require the apportionment
of the profit in question, this may well have been the correct decision. The assumption is difficult to
reconcilable with Kirk's case however and, therefore, apparently 77 wrong. But, whether his conclusion
was correct or not, the reasoning by which he reached it seems plainly to be flawed.
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*12 In reaching the conclusion that the Inland Revenue Ordinance did not require the apportionment
of the Dock company's profit, Reece J relied principally on the following passage from the judgment of
Dixon J in Commissioner of Taxation (New South Wales) v Hillsdon Watts Ltd:
*12 In the absence of [a statutory provision expressly requiring apportionment], when a single profit is
recovered as a result of operations which extend beyond the political boundary of the taxing state, the
profit must be considered as arising on one side of the boundary rather than the other. If it is possible
to ascertain how much of the profit is obtained although in an unrealized form at successive stages of
the operations, the sum realized may be dissected and separate parts of it attributed accordingly to
the places where the respective stages of the operations are completed. If this cannot be done and
the total profit recovered is an inseparable whole obtained as the indiscriminate result of the entirety
of the operations, the locality where it arises must be determined by considerations which fasten upon
the acts more immediately responsible for the receipt of the profit. (See Commissioner of Taxation v D
& W Murray Ltd (1929) 42 CLR 332; Federal Commissioner of Taxation v W Angliss & Co Pty Ltd
(1931) 46 CLR 417.) 78
*13 Reece J did not explain why he chose to rely on this particular passage, or even why he chose to
rely on this particular case. But his reliance seems misplaced, for three main reasons. First, it is not
clear that Dixon J was correct, as a matter of Australian law, to posit the existence of categories of
profit which are not apportionable, except where apportionment is expressly required by the
legislation. There seems to be very little authority on this point and so whether Dixon J was correct or
not is debatable. In other words, Kirk's case, properly *76 interpreted, might require apportionment of
all profits derived partly from within the taxing jurisdiction and partly from outside it, Dixon J's dictum
notwithstanding. 79 The court in Hillsdon Watts was comprised of five judges, each of whom delivered
his own judgment. All five came to the same conclusion (that apportionment was required), but none
of the other four (Latham CJ, Rich, Evatt, and McTiernan JJ) endorsed Dixon J's view that a profit
might be derived partly from within the taxing jurisdiction and partly from outside it and yet not require
apportionment. Therefore, assuming that Reece J was justified in relying on Hillsdon Watts at all, his
analysis of the case should have focused on the views of the majority, not on those peculiar to Dixon
J. Moreover, Dixon J's conclusion in Hillsdon Watts was that apportionment was required. His
suggestion that other profits, assessed to tax under other statutes, 80 in other cases, might not be
apportionable was, therefore, obiter.
*13 Second, even if Dixon J was correct, as a matter of Australian law, in stating that there are
categories of profit to which the rule in Kirk's case does not apply, it does not necessarily follow that
the law of Hong Kong is the same as the law of Australia in this respect. The reason is simply that
Dixon J's analysis in Hillsdon Watts seems not to be based on any decision of the Privy Council, nor
to have been endorsed by the Privy Council in any subsequent case. 81 In other words, Reece J's
consideration of apportionment should have been guided principally by the binding decisions of the
Privy Council in Kirk's case, the International Harvester case, 82 and the Wrigley case, 83 rather than
by the merely persuasive decisions of the Australian courts.
*13 Third, even if Dixon J's analysis is sound, and even if it holds in Hong Kong, Reece J should not
have regarded it as applicable in the Dock case. Dixon J was bound by Kirk's case, in which the Privy
Council established that in some circumstances, at least, source-based income tax legislation
implicitly requires the apportionment of profits derived partly from the taxing jurisdiction and partly
from outside it. But, according to Dixon J, there are exceptions to this rule. In other words, according
to Dixon J, there are categories of profits which must be regarded as ‘inseparable,’ and which cannot
be apportioned; and which must, therefore, be either taxable in full or not taxable at all, even if derived
partly from the taxing jurisdiction and partly from elsewhere. It is unclear which kinds of profits Dixon J
thought might be covered by his dictum, because he gave no examples. Perhaps he had in mind
forms of income such as interest, *77 the apportionment of which might indeed present difficulties. 84
What does seem plain, however, is that, if Dixon J's dictum is correct at all, it does not apply to profits
made by providing services.
*14 In the Dock case, Reece J held that the taxpayer's profit was not susceptible to apportionment,
that it ‘must be said to arise outside of Hong Kong rather than inside,’ 85 and that it was therefore not
taxable at all. His reasoning seems to have been essentially that it was impossible to dissect the
taxpayer's profit because the facts of the case afforded no basis upon which separate parts of the
profit could be attributed to the places where the taxpayer had undertaken the various stages of the
operations which had produced the profit. Consequently, he regarded the ‘total profit’ as ‘an
inseparable whole obtained as the indiscriminate result of the entirety of the [taxpayer's] operations.’
86 But, even assuming that Dixon J was correct in postulating the existence of categories of profits
which are ‘inseparable,’ 87 Reece J seems clearly to have been wrong to treat the profit in question in
the Dock case as of this kind. The reason is that it would seem to have been not only possible but
relatively straightforward (adopting the words of Dixon J) ‘to ascertain how much of the profit is
obtained although in an unrealized form at successive stages of the [taxpayer's] operations.’ In
particular, there seems to be no reason for regarding the Dock company's profit as any more
‘inseparable’ than the profits which were ordered to be apportioned in the three binding Privy Council
decisions 88 and by various other courts in various other cases. 89 On the contrary, it seems likely that
a profit made by supplying services will be more easily apportioned than a profit made by
manufacturing and selling goods. 90
*14 In any event, Reece J proceeded on the apparently erroneous basis that either the whole profit
was taxable, or none of it was. Having allowed himself only these two alternatives, however, he was
troubled by Dixon J's proposition that, in cases in which apportionment is impossible, the source of
the profit must be determined by reference to ‘the acts more immediately responsible for the receipt of
the profit.’ 91 The contract between the Dock company and the owner of the Bintang provided for ‘no
cure - no pay.’ 92 That is, the Dock company was not entitled to payment at all until it completed the
salvage and returned the ship to its owner in Hong Kong. The act ‘more immediately *78 responsible
for the receipt of the profit’ would thus appear to have been the return of the ship to its owner. This
analysis leads to the conclusion that the profit was entirely derived from Hong Kong, since that was
where the ship was returned to its owner.
*14 In order to avoid this conclusion, however, Reece J turned to Kirk's case. His analysis of Kirk
begins with the headnote, virtually 93 the whole of which he recited verbatim (and which I have quoted
in full at note 25). But as I have explained, this headnote is ambiguous and deceptively-worded. It
makes no mention of apportionment. Rather, it seems to suggest that the profit in question was held
to be taxable in full, and that apportionment was not required; and that, it seems, is what Reece J took
it to mean. In any event, whether misled by the headnote, or by the judgment itself, Reece J seems to
have thought that the Privy Council in Kirk held that apportionment was not required. But as I have
explained, the whole point of Kirk's case is that apportionment was required.
*15 After reciting the headnote, Reece J adopted the following passage from the judgment itself:
*15 The fallacy of the judgment of the Supreme Court [of New South Wales] in this and in Tindal's
case 94 is in leaving out of sight the initial stages, and fastening their attention exclusively on the final
stage in the production of the income. 95
*15 And the following statement from the judgment of Latham CJ in Hillsdon Watts:
*15 Income which is received by a person may be the result of a whole series of operations 96
conducted in different countries. When it becomes necessary to determine what are the sources of
income it is a mistake to concentrate attention on ‘the final stage’ 97 in the operations which actually
brings in the money which constitutes the gross income. 98
*15 Reece J took these passages as authority for not regarding ‘the final stage’ of the Dock
company's operations as necessarily decisive. This, in turn, freed him to focus on the fact ‘that
substantially the whole of the salvage operations, *79 excluding the short tow in the Colony waters
which terminated the salvage, took place outside the Colony.’ 99 And so, on this basis, Reece J
concluded that the whole of the profit had been derived from outside Hong Kong and that it was
therefore not taxable at all.
*15 The problem with this, of course, is that in both Kirk's case and Hillsdon Watts it was held that
apportionment was required. When Lord Davey said in Kirk that it is a fallacy to fasten attention
‘exclusively on the final stage’ of the taxpayer's operations, he did not mean (as Reece J seems to
have taken him to mean) that the final stage can be disregarded altogether. Rather, what Lord Davey
intended is that attention should be fastened on the whole of the taxpayer's operations, and that a
part of the profit should be attributed to each stage in the series of which the whole is comprised.
Similarly, when Latham CJ in Hillsdon Watts said that ‘it is a mistake to concentrate attention on the
“final stage,”’ he clearly did not mean that the final stage should be completely ignored. Rather, like
Lord Davey in Kirk, he meant that a part of the profit should be attributed to each stage in the series of
operations which produced the profit.
*15 Thus, Reece J's basic error was not to follow Kirk's case. This case, properly interpreted, required
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apportionment of the Dock company's profit. 100 Since Kirk's case was a decision of the Privy Council,
Reece J was bound to come to this conclusion, but did not. Instead, he based his decision on Dixon
J's obiter dictum in Hillsdon Watts to the effect that some profits are not susceptible to apportionment.
But, even if it is assumed that Dixon J was correct (that is, even if it is assumed that there is such a
thing as a profit which is derived partly from within the taxing jurisdiction and partly outside it, and yet
which is not required to be apportioned), there seems to be no reason for regarding the Dock
company's profit as being of this kind, and Reece J offered none.
The perpetuation and compounding of the error
*16 Salvage is a relatively unimportant form of economic activity. Had the Dock case been confined to
its facts, its effect would have been correspondingly insignificant; but it was not. On the contrary, it
was to prove extremely influential. 101 Indeed, the currently prevailing interpretation of s 14 of the
Inland Revenue Ordinance seems to be squarely based on it. First, the Dock case confirmed that it is
possible, as a matter of law, for a firm to carry on business in Hong Kong, and nowhere else, and yet
to derive part of its profit, or even all *80 of its profit, from outside Hong Kong. In other words, the
case established that the profits of a Hong Kong firm are not necessarily taxable in Hong Kong, even
if the firm has no branch office in any other jurisdiction and even if it is obviously not liable to tax in
any other jurisdiction. In this respect, the case is both correct 102 and fundamentally important.
*16 But, according to the Inland Revenue Department, although it is possible for a Hong Kong firm
without a permanent establishment outside Hong Kong to derive profit from outside Hong Kong, it is
only in ‘rare cases' that this will be so. 103 This position is based on a statement to this effect in the
Privy Council's decision in the Hong Kong case Commissioner of Inland Revenue v HK-TVB
International Ltd, 104 but it seems probable that its real source was the Dock case (which was cited by
the Privy Council in HK-TVB International as one such ‘rare case’ 105), because it happened to
concern salvage, rather than some more common form of commercial endeavour, such as trading or
manufacturing. But this ‘rare case’ dictum is misleading, for it is misconceived to infer the frequency
with which a phenomenon occurs in the real world from the frequency with which it appears in the law
reports. The number of firms deriving profits from outside Hong Kong has actually always been
substantial, but the overwhelming majority of these firms have not appeared in the law reports for the
simple reason that the Inland Revenue Department has accepted, correctly, that their profits are not
subject to tax. 106 Moreover, once it is accepted that a profit escapes tax if the taxpayer organises his
business in a certain way, 107 this particular mode of organisation will obviously tend to become less
rare, because other firms are likely to copy it so that they, too, can escape tax.
*16 The Department's current position on apportionment is as follows: ‘Although the Department
accepts that apportionment is permissible 108 under the *81 Inland Revenue Ordinance, it does not
consider that it will have a wide application.’ 109 The Department seems to have offered no legal
justification for this restrictive premise as to the circumstances in which s 14 requires the
apportionment of profits but, again, it seems to be based on the Dock case 110 and, again, it seems to
be wrong. The scope of the rule in Kirk's case may be debatable, but even the narrowest plausible
interpretation (that the rule is confined to manufacturers of goods and providers of services 111) seems
irreconcilable with the Department's proposition that apportionment will not ‘have a wide application.’
*17 The premise that apportionment will not have ‘a wide application’ is fundamental to the
Department's approach to the taxation of the profits of virtually all firms other than those whose
activities are strictly confined to Hong Kong. The reason is that this premise leads the Department to
maintain almost invariably 112 that a Hong Kong firm's profit must be either taxable in full, or not
taxable at all. Moreover, the Department is loath to accept that a profit made by a firm carrying on
business in Hong Kong and without a permanent establishment anywhere else is not taxable at all.
Consequently, the Department's premise that apportionment will not have a wide application leads it
ultimately to maintain almost invariably that the profits of a firm carrying on business in Hong Kong
must be taxable in full, unless it has a permanent establishment outside Hong Kong to which part, or
all, of the profits can properly be attributed. In other words, Reece J's erroneously restrictive
conclusions as to apportionment are fundamental to the misleading ‘rare case’ doctrine.
*17 Perhaps the most important consequences of the Department's restrictive position on
apportionment are its positions on manufacturing profits (that is, profits made by manufacturing and
selling goods) and trading profits (profits made by buying and selling goods). According to the
Department, manufacturing profits are derived entirely from the place where the manufacturing takes
place. Consequently, the Department rejects categorically the possibility that the Inland Revenue
Ordinance might implicitly require the apportionment of profits made by manufacturing goods in Hong
Kong and selling them elsewhere. According to the Department, such profits are entirely attributable
to the manufacturing. Therefore, they are taxable in full, 113 irrespective of offshore marketing
activities. 114 This interpretation is obviously and directly contrary *82 to the Privy Council decisions in
Kirk, 115 International Harvester Co, 116 and Wrigley, 117 to every case in the series decided by the High
Court of Australia, 118 and to various other Australian and New Zealand cases. 119
*17 The Department seems not to have offered any legal reason for disregarding these cases, but it
seems likely that the source of its restrictive position as to apportionment is the Dock case. But Reece
J's rejection of apportionment in the Dock case was based on Kirk and Hillsdon Watts and, as I have
explained, Reece J seems to have misinterpreted both cases. That the Department's current position
(that a profit made by manufacturing goods in Hong Kong and selling them elsewhere is derived
entirely from Hong Kong and, therefore, taxable in full) seems to be derived (via the Dock case) from
Kirk and Hillsdon Watts is particularly ironic, given that both Kirk and Hillsdon Watts concerned profits
made by manufacturing goods in one jurisdiction and selling them in another and that, in both cases,
it was held that apportionment was required. 120
*18 The Department's position on trading profits seems even more seriously flawed. According to the
Department, trading profits are not apportionable in any circumstances. Rather, even when the goods
are purchased in Hong Kong and sold elsewhere (or purchased elsewhere and sold in Hong Kong),
such profits are, according to the Department, ‘either wholly taxable or wholly non-taxable.’ 121
Moreover, the Department's ‘initial presumption’ is that a profit made by buying goods in Hong Kong
and selling them elsewhere is derived in its entirety from Hong Kong; 122 and apparently it is only in
‘rare cases' that the Department will accept that this presumption can be rebutted. 123 Again, this
analysis seems to be derived from the Dock case, for the Dock case was the source both of the ‘rare
case’ doctrine and of the notion that apportionment does not have a ‘wide application.’
*18 But, again, the reasoning in the Dock case is based on Kirk and Hillsdon Watts, and the Hong
Kong Inland Revenue Department's current position on the source of trading profits is not readily
reconcilable with either Kirk or Hillsdon Watts. In Kirk, the Privy Council held that a profit made by
manufacturing goods in New South Wales and selling them in the United *83 Kingdom was derived
partly from New South Wales and partly from the United Kingdom; and that apportionment was
therefore required. Whether Kirk's case means that a profit made by buying goods in one jurisdiction
and selling them in another must be apportioned is debatable. 124 But, if it does not, it seems clear that
the rule in Kirk's case is an exception to (and therefore also confirmation of) a more general rule that a
profit made on the sale of goods is derived in its entirety from the place where the goods are sold. 125
In Hillsdon Watts, the High Court of Australia held that a profit made by buying goods in New South
Wales and selling them elsewhere was derived partly from New South Wales and partly from outside
New South Wales, and that apportionment was therefore required.
*18 Moreover, the part of Hillsdon Watts upon which Reece J relied in the Dock case was the
passage of Dixon J recited above; 126 and, as authority for the views there expressed, Dixon J cited
Murray 127 and Angliss. 128 But the current position of Hong Kong's Inland Revenue Department on the
source of trading profits seems irreconcilable with these cases also. In Murray, it was held
unanimously (by a court of which Dixon J was a member) that a profit made by buying goods in the
United Kingdom and selling them in Western Australia was derived entirely from Western Australia,
where the goods were sold. In Angliss, the majority (in a judgment delivered by Dixon J) held that a
profit made by buying goods in Australia and selling them in the United Kingdom was derived entirely
from the United Kingdom, although it was held also that source-based income tax legislation might
implicitly require the apportionment of trading profits in circumstances other than those of the case
before the court.
*19 Thus, these four cases (Kirk, Murray, Angliss, and Hillsdon Watts) and many others 129 seem
clearly to establish that a profit made by buying goods in one jurisdiction and selling them in another
is derived in its entirety from the place where the goods are sold, unless apportionment is required, in
which case part (but only part) of the profit is attributable to the place where the goods are purchased.
In contrast, the Department's position (that a profit made by buying goods in Hong Kong and selling
them elsewhere is entirely derived from Hong Kong, except in rare cases) enjoys very little judicial
support. 130
The scope of the rule in Kirk's case
*19 The rule in Kirk's case can be expressed at various levels of generality. Conceivably, the rule is
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confined to manufacturers. In other words, it is possible that source-based income tax legislation
implicitly requires the apportionment of profits made by manufacturing goods in one jurisdiction and
selling them in another, 131 but not of profits made by any other method. It is also possible, however,
that the rule should be formulated in broader terms. At its broadest, it is possible to interpret Kirk's
case as establishing that source-based income tax legislation implicitly requires 132 apportionment in
all cases in which the taxpayer has derived a profit from a ‘series of operations,’ some performed
within the taxing jurisdiction and some outside it. In other words, it is possible that Dixon J, in
suggesting that there exist categories of profit which are not apportionable, was simply wrong.
Perhaps the clearest expression of this interpretation is the following statement from the judgment of
Starke J in Dickson v Commissioners of Taxation: 133
*19 If the income was derived from a series of operations, some of which were performed in New
South Wales and some outside that state, then some part of that income must be attributed to
sources outside New South Wales, and an apportionment is necessary.
*19 The rule in Kirk's case has been considered in a number of subsequent Privy Council decisions,
but these provide little guidance as to the scope of the rule. *85 The only cases (apart from Kirk's
case itself) in which the Privy Council has ordered apportionment seem to be International Harvester
Co of Canada Ltd v Provincial Tax Commission 134 and Provincial Treasurer of Manitoba v Wm J
Wrigley Co Ltd 135 but, as I have indicated, 136 neither of these cases is of much assistance in defining
the scope of the rule in Kirk's case.
*20 The possibility of apportionment was also considered, but rejected, by the Privy Council in
Commissioner of Taxes v British Australian Wool Realization Association Ltd 137 (the BAWRA case)
and in the Hong Kong case Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Hang Seng Bank Ltd. 138 The taxpayer
in the BAWRA case was a company established for the purpose of disposing of wool which the
Australian and British governments had acquired during the First World War but which had proved to
be surplus to their requirements. Some of the wool was transferred to the taxpayer by the Australian
government. This wool was sold by the taxpayer, on its own account, outside Australia. The
commissioner (applying the rule in Kirk's case) assessed the taxpayer on the basis that 25 per cent of
the profit on such sales was sourced in Australia and therefore taxable. The taxpayer also sold on
commission wool belonging to the British government. Again, the sales were effected outside
Australia. The commissioner (again applying the rule in Kirk's case) assessed the taxpayer on the
basis that 40 per cent of the profit on these sales was sourced in Australia and therefore taxable. But
the Privy Council held that both categories of profit arose entirely outside Australia, that no tax was
payable at all, and that the question of apportionment therefore did not arise. The Privy Council said
virtually nothing in the BAWRA case, however, as to when apportionment is required and when it is
not.
*20 In the Hang Seng Bank case, the taxpayer made profits by buying and selling certificates of
deposit in Singapore and London. The issue of apportionment arose because it was maintained on
behalf of the Commissioner that, if the taxpayer's profits were not taxable in full, they were at least
taxable in part. 139 Counsel for the Commissioner continued:
*20 The apportionment could be done in three ways: (1) by reference to the management costs
attributable to the certificate of deposit transactions incurred in Hong Kong and outside Hong Kong;
(2) a subjective evaluation by the apportioning tribunal of the relative importance of what was done
inside and outside Hong Kong or (3) an equal division. 140
*20 *86 The Privy Council rejected this submission and held that the profits in question were not
taxable at all. In coming to this conclusion, however, the Judicial Committee observed that s 14 of
Hong Kong's Inland Revenue Ordinance does implicitly require the apportionment of profits in some
circumstances. 141 In other words, the Privy Council effectively confirmed that the rule in Kirk's case
applies in Hong Kong although, curiously, the judgment does not mention Kirk's case, or the
International Harvester case, 142 or any of the other cases on apportionment. 143 But, although the
Judicial Committee rejected the suggestion that apportionment was required in the Hang Seng Bank
case, it did not explain why. 144 Thus, although apportionment was considered by the Privy Council in
both the BAWRA case and the Hang Seng Bank case, neither of these cases offers much guidance in
principle as to when apportionment is required, or how it is to be calculated. Various other Privy
Council decisions 145 in which apportionment was not discussed may also, nonetheless, offer some
guidance as to when apportionment is not required.
*21 Although the scope of the rule in Kirk's case is unclear, it is difficult to conceive of any principled
basis upon which it could be denied that the rule applies to profits produced by supplying services. In
other words, it seems clear, given Kirk's case, that source-based income tax legislation implicitly
requires the apportionment of profits made by providing services partly within the taxing jurisdiction
and partly outside it. 146 Indeed, the problem with the Dock case was precisely Reece J's failure to
deal with this point. Beyond its application to services cases, however, very little is clear as to the
scope of the rule in Kirk's case.
*21 In particular, it is unclear whether apportionment is required, in any circumstances, of profits
made by selling goods which the taxpayer has purchased, rather than manufactured. This question
has been considered by the courts on several occasions, but never definitively answered. But if (as
Kirk's case seems clearly to establish) a profit made by manufacturing goods in Hong Kong and
selling them elsewhere is in some circumstances taxable only in part *87 in Hong Kong, it would be
absurd if a profit made by merely buying goods in Hong Kong and selling them elsewhere were
necessarily taxable in full. Therefore, if Kirk's case, properly interpreted, requires apportionment of
profits made by manufacturing goods in one jurisdiction and selling them in another, but not of profits
made by buying goods in one jurisdiction and selling them in another, the case must also be taken as
confirming that a profit made by buying goods in one jurisdiction and selling them in another is
derived, in its entirety, from the place where the goods are sold. This interpretation is supported by
the Privy Council's decisions in Lovell & Christmas Ltd 147 and in the BAWRA case 148 and by the
decision of the High Court of Australia in Murray. 149
*21 It is also possible, however, that the rule in Kirk's case applies to profits made by buying goods in
one jurisdiction and selling them in another. In other words, it is possible that s 14 of Hong Kong's
Inland Revenue Ordinance, properly interpreted in accordance with Kirk's case, implicitly requires the
apportionment of profits made by buying goods in Hong Kong and selling them elsewhere. This
interpretation is most clearly supported by Michell v Federal Commissioner of Taxation, 150 in which
the taxpayer bought goods in Australia and sold them elsewhere. The court held that 50:50
apportionment was required. Similarly, in Dalgety & Co Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation 151 the
taxpayer, in Western Australia, entered into agreements with a number of Western Australian primary
producers to sell their produce on commission in the United Kingdom. It was held that apportionment
was required of the profits produced in this way. And the High Court of Australia in Hillsdon Watts 152
ordered apportionment of a profit made by buying and selling goods.
*22 The current position of Hong Kong's Inland Revenue Department (that trading profits are not
apportionable in any circumstances) seems to be based on the suggestion made by Dixon J in
Hillsdon Watts (and inappropriately adopted by Reece J in the Dock case) that some categories of
profit are not apportionable. In other words, the Department's position seems to be, first, that Dixon
J's dictum is correct and, second, that the dictum applies to trading profits. It is worth emphasising,
however, that Dixon J, although suggesting in Hillsdon Watts that some kinds of profit are not
apportionable, did not regard trading profits as one of those kinds. On the contrary, it is clear from his
judgment in Angliss 153 that Dixon J regarded trading profits as apportionable in some circumstances.
*22 *88 Alternatively, it may be that the rule in Kirk's case should be defined by reference not to the
method by which the taxpayer produced the profit in question, but (as proposed in Murray 154 and
Angliss 155) to added value. That is, apportionment is required if (and only if) the taxpayer has added
value both within and without the taxing jurisdiction. And, in such cases, the profit chargeable to tax is
to be calculated by reference to the value added within the taxing jurisdiction. In other words, on this
analysis, added value determines both whether apportionment is required and how it is to be
calculated. 156
*22 The consequences of this analysis are profound. In Angliss, the taxpayer manufactured goods in
Australia and sold them in the United Kingdom. The taxpayer could not have sold the goods in
Australia at a profit. On this basis, the majority (in the High Court of Australia) held that none of the
profit was derived from Australia, that the whole of the profit was derived from the United Kingdom,
and, therefore, that the profit was not taxable at all. In other words, the principle in Kirk's case did not
apply and apportionment was not required. If this is correct, Hong Kong manufacturers 157 should
escape Hong Kong tax on their exports altogether, if they can establish that no market for their goods
exists in Hong Kong. But the analysis in Angliss cuts both ways. If the Hong Kong manufacturer could
have sold the goods in Hong Kong and thereby realised a profit equal to the profit in fact made by
selling its goods outside Hong Kong, then none of the added value is attributable to the selling of the
goods outside Hong Kong. Thus, Dixon J's reasoning in Angliss seems to lead to the conclusion that
in such cases apportionment is not required. In other words, if the whole of the profit is attributable to
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value added in Hong Kong by the manufacturing of the goods, rather than to the effecting of sales
outside Hong Kong, then the whole profit is derived from Hong Kong and is therefore taxable in Hong
Kong. Finally, it is possible that the firm might have been able to sell the goods in Hong Kong at a
profit, but a smaller profit than was in fact realised by selling them outside Hong Kong. In this case,
Dixon J's analysis in Angliss requires that the profit be apportioned. To the extent that a profit could
have been made by selling the goods in Hong Kong, the actual profit should be regarded as having
been derived from Hong Kong. The actual profit is, therefore, taxable to that extent. But to the extent
that the actual profit exceeds the profit which could have been made by selling the goods in Hong
Kong, it is derived from the place where the goods were sold and, therefore, is not taxable in Hong
Kong.
*23 *89 According to Angliss, much the same reasoning applies to trading profits. Thus, if a firm
makes a profit by buying goods in Hong Kong and selling them outside Hong Kong, the profit might be
derived entirely from the purchase, entirely from the sale, or partly from the purchase and partly from
the sale, depending on the circumstances. Consequently, the profit might be taxable in full in Hong
Kong, or not taxable at all, or taxable in part. If the firm could not have made any profit at all by selling
the goods in Hong Kong, the whole of the profit must be attributed to the place where it sold them. (It
was for precisely this reason that the majority held in Angliss that the taxpayer's profit on the sale in
the United Kingdom of tallow which it had purchased from other suppliers in Australia was not taxable
at all in Australia. That is, the taxpayer in Angliss could not have sold the tallow in Australia at a profit
at all.) Conversely, if the firm could have sold the goods in Hong Kong, and thereby realised a profit
equal to the profit in fact made by selling the goods elsewhere, then none of the added value is
attributable to the selling of the goods outside Hong Kong. Consequently, in this case, the whole of
the profit would be attributable to the purchases and would therefore be taxable in Hong Kong.
Finally, as in the case of a manufacturer, it is possible that the trader might have been able to sell its
goods in Hong Kong at a profit, but a smaller profit than was in fact realised by selling them outside
Hong Kong. In this case, again, Dixon J's analysis in Angliss requires that the profit be apportioned.
*23 It is also possible that the rule in Kirk's case, whether applicable to trading profits or not, is subject
to various other qualifications. In particular, it seems possible that the rule might be subject to a de
minimis exception. Thus, if the part of the profit derived from outside Hong Kong is insubstantial, it
may be disregarded, and so the profit is taxable in full. Conversely, if the part of the profit derived from
within Hong Kong is insubstantial, then it can be disregarded, and so the profit is not taxable at all.
Take, for example, the case of a profit made by manufacturing goods in Hong Kong and selling them
outside Hong Kong. The facts of the case might suggest that almost the whole of the profit was
derived from the manufacturing of the goods in Hong Kong, and that only a very small part of the
profit was attributable to the selling of the goods outside Hong Kong. In such a case, it might be
legitimate to disregard the fact that a small part of the profit was derived from outside Hong Kong. If
so, the profit would be taxable in full. Conversely, if a firm manufactures goods outside Hong Kong
and sells them in Hong Kong, the facts of the case might suggest that virtually the whole of the profit
thereby produced is sourced outside Hong Kong. If so, the correct conclusion may be that the profit is
not taxable in Hong Kong at all. It must be acknowledged, however, that although it would seem *90
reasonable to confine the rule in Kirk to cases which are not de minimis, the idea seems not to have
been raised by, or before, the courts. 158
*24 At one point, the Australian taxing authorities seem to have drawn a distinction between two
different ways in which an Australian exporter (whether a manufacturer or a trader) might operate its
business. If the firm exported its goods first, and then sold them, the authorities accepted (on the
basis of Kirk's case) that part of the profit was derived from outside Australia. But if the firm entered
into a contract of sale first, and then shipped the goods, the authorities maintained that the whole
profit was derived from Australia. But this distinction seems not to have been based on any legal
authority and subsequently to have been abandoned by the authorities. 159
*24 In Kirk's case, and in most of the other cases in which it was held that apportionment was
required, 160 the taxpayer had a permanent establishment in both of the jurisdictions concerned. Lest it
be suggested, on this basis, that Hong Kong's Inland Revenue Ordinance requires apportionment
only where the taxpayer has a permanent establishment outside Hong Kong, it may be worth
explaining why this seems to be wrong. The reason is that one of the few aspects of the source
principle which seem to have been established beyond doubt is that it is possible for a firm to carry on
business in Hong Kong, and nowhere else, and yet to derive profit from outside Hong Kong. 161 The
proposition that apportionment is required only if the taxpayer has a permanent establishment outside
Hong Kong seems impossible to reconcile with this proposition, for it would be absurd for the law to
be that a profit can be entirely derived from outside Hong Kong even if the taxpayer has no
permanent establishment outside Hong Kong, but that a profit can be partly derived from outside
Hong Kong only if the taxpayer has a permanent establishment outside Hong Kong. That this is so is
confirmed by a number of cases in which the taxpayer had no offshore permanent establishment and
yet it was held that apportionment was required. 162 On the other hand, if the rule in Kirk's case is
subject to a de minimis exception, the existence of a permanent establishment *91 outside Hong
Kong might assist the taxpayer in demonstrating that the part of its profit derived from outside Hong
Kong is not de minimis.
*24 Whether apportionment might, depending on the circumstances, be required of other forms of
profits, such as interest, royalties, dividends, insurance premiums, and sums received for the use of
movable property, is unclear. The Australian courts seem consistently to have held that profits of
these kinds are either taxable in full or not at all. 163 But, even if it is assumed that these decisions are
correct, it does not follow that such profits are never apportionable, in any circumstances. On the
contrary, there seems every reason to regard the rule in Kirk's case as applicable to profits of these
kinds in some circumstances. The issues are too complex to address comprehensively here, but take,
for example, a profit made by hiring out movable property, such as machinery. Depending on the
circumstances, such a profit can have its source, it seems, in the place where the machinery is used
by the hirer. 164 Therefore, if the hirer uses the machinery partly in Hong Kong and partly outside Hong
Kong, apportionment is required.
Conclusion
*25 In 1900, in Kirk's case, the Privy Council established the basic rule that source-based income tax
legislation requires the apportionment, in some circumstances at least, of profits derived partly from
within the taxing jurisdiction and partly outside it. As a Privy Council decision rendered before 1 July
1997, Kirk's case may still be of binding authority in Hong Kong. Presumably the Court of Final Appeal
will regard itself as competent to depart from Privy Council decisions but will take this course only
where there exist compelling reasons for doing so. But, although Kirk's case establishes that
apportionment is required in some circumstances, it gives little guidance as to what those
circumstances are, and even less as to how, in circumstances in which apportionment is required, it is
to be calculated. The Privy Council also discussed apportionment in several other cases 165 but none
of them contributes much to the resolution of the questions left unanswered in Kirk.
*25 *92 There are also, of course, the Australian cases. 166 These add up to a very substantial body
of jurisprudence, created by some very strong courts. But the Australian cases, although obviously
relevant to the interpretation of the rule in Kirk's case (and also, therefore, to the interpretation of s 14
of Hong Kong's Inland Revenue Ordinance), nonetheless failed to resolve the basic uncertainties as
to the scope of the rule. 167 Also, of course, the decisions of the Australian courts (unlike those of the
Privy Council) are not binding on the courts of Hong Kong.
*25 Thus it can be concluded only that the scope of Hong Kong profits tax remains uncertain. It is
clear that s 14 of the Inland Revenue Ordinance requires the apportionment of profits in some
circumstances; and it seems clear also that most of what Reece J said about apportionment in the
Dock case was at best misleading, if not wrong; but fundamental uncertainties persist both as to when
apportionment is required and as to how, in circumstances in which it is required, it is to be calculated.
168 Since these questions are of substantial practical importance, it seems likely that Hong Kong's
courts will sooner or later be called upon to answer them, and it is to be hoped that, when so called
upon, they will address the issues squarely, and that they will not perpetuate the plainly flawed
reasoning in the Dock case.
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